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Notes on Biodiversity Conservation, 
The Rate of Interest and Discounting‡
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article shows that there is no regular relationship between the level of the rate of 
interest and the extent to which the conservation of biodiversity is favoured. 
Microeconomic examples are given in which a rise in the rate of interest adversely 
affects biodiversity conservation as well as other cases in which the opposite is the 
case. When these alternative possibilities are taken into account, they suggest that 
rises in the rate of interest (other things held constant) are more likely than not to aid 
biodiversity conservation. This is expected to be so when there considerable upfront 
costs are involved in economic strategies that bring about environmental changes so 
that in the initial periods the private net benefits from these changes are negative 
although subsequently they can become significantly positive. Consideration of 
macroeconomic models reinforces the view that there is no definite association 
between changes in biodiversity conservation and the rate of interest. This is so 
assuming that there is a positive association on the whole, between the rate of (man-
made) capital accumulation (the investment level) and biodiversity loss. From 
macroeconomic models, it is clear an increase in the level of aggregate investment can 
be associated with a rise or fall in the rate of interest (and vice versa) depending on 
the circumstances. This is illustrated by using a simplified form of the loanable funds 
theory originally developed by Wicksell but is also consistent with other general 
theories of the rate of interest. In conclusion, doubts are raised about our ability to 
enforce a zero (or very low) social rate of discount in market or mixed economy. It is, 
however, suggested that if a low ceiling is put on the rate of interest, this will reduce 
savings and consequently, investment and would be favourable to biodiversity 
conservation given that an increase in the rate of (man-made) capital accumulation is 
the main contributor to biodiversity loss. Finally, it is noted that mainstream economic 
models measuring possible welfare streams give no weight to the conservation of 
biodiversity per se. Therefore, policies designed to achieve the sustainability 
objectives specified by these models can continue to favour biodiversity loss on 
economic grounds. 
                                                 
‡ I wish to thank Dr. Bruce Littleboy for discussing relevant aspects of the theory of interest with me. 
 
Notes on Biodiversity Conservation, 
The Rate of Interest and Discounting 
 
1. Introduction 
Some economists have expressed support for a zero rate (e.g. Ramsey, 1928) or very 
low social discount rate and many economists have seen this as favourable to the 
conservation of natural capital, including biodiversity (e.g. Dasgupta and Mäler, 
2000). However, it does not follow that a low interest rate is necessarily favourable to 
biodiversity conservation. In fact, there appears to be no regular relationship between 
the level of the real rate of interest and the extent to which biodiversity conservation is 
favoured. One needs to consider what forces cause the interest rate to be high or low 
and it is the nature of these forces that have critical impacts on the conservation of 
biodiversity. This will be explained using a very crude model of factors that determine 
the rate of interest. In this simplified macro-model the interest rate is determined 
endogenously. However, prior to considering this matter it seems worthwhile 
considering the conservation implications of microeconomic models in which the rate 
of interest is treated as an exogenous variable. 
 
2. Micro-models in which the Rate of Interest is an Exogenous Variable 
Colin Clark (1976) observed that an increase in the rate of interest (other things held 
constant) is likely to increase the probability of extinction of commercially exploited 
species if the cost of realizing (liquidating) their stocks is zero or very low and they 
are privately owned. As the rate of interest rises, those who own the biological asset 
are likely in these cases to increase their monetary gain by harvesting this asset to 
extinction and investing the net revenue obtained at the going rate of interest. Thus, 
for example, if a 5% annual net return is earned on the sustainable harvest of a species, 
it will be profitable to retain it if the rate of interest is less than 5% but not if it is in 
excess of 5%, say 8%. Note that it will also pay not to retain the species if it can be 
replaced at little upfront cost by another that gives a higher rate of private return. The 
lesson drawn from this example is that markets (free of economic failures) do not 
necessarily ensure the conservation of biodiversity. 
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If (on the other hand) the biological resource is an open-access one, harvesters of it 
take no account of user costs and their conservation decisions are not influenced by 
the rate of interest. Despite this, the rate of exploitation of the targeted resource 
(species) can be sensitive to the rate of interest. Other things held constant, a higher 
rate of interest can be expected to reduce investment in the exploitation of the species, 
for example, less investment in capital equipment is likely. Thus, in the case of open-
access resources that are commercially exploited, a higher rate of interest is likely to 
be favourable to the conservation of biodiversity.  
 
Even in the private ownership case considered by Colin Clark (1976), biodiversity 
conservation can be favoured by a high rate of interest if the upfront costs of 
conversion or realization of a biological asset are high and the benefits obtained by 
conversion or realization are not immediate. Usually, conversion or realization 
involves significant upfront costs because conversion, substitution or liquidation of 
stocks of species does not take place instantaneously. Therefore, decisions to engage 
in (land) conversion which leads to the extinction of some species or to liquidate 
species as assets may at first result in costs exceeding benefits with net benefits only 
becoming positive at a later time.  
 
Consequently, the flow of net benefits from conversion of habitat resulting in species 
extinction, from the substitution of species or the liquidation of biological assets may 
typically display the type of pattern shown in Figure 1 by curve ABC. This implies 
that, as the rate of interest rises, the net present value of these strategies falls. 
Therefore, the profitability of adopting these strategies declines. In these 
circumstances, a rise in the rate of interest is favourable to biodiversity conservation. 
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Figure 1: The ‘typical’ flow of possible net benefits from liquidating a species as an 
asset, substituting it by another or converting habitat which results in the 
loss of species. In the case illustrated, net benefits are negative initially 
(until t1) and a rising rate of interest reduces private economic benefits 
from these strategies. In this private ownership case, a rising rate of 
interest is favourable to the conservation of biodiversity. 
 
These microeconomic examples indicate that a rising rate of real interest can be 
favourable to biodiversity conservation and suggest that it is favourable in most cases. 
This is because the activities described usually require considerable upfront costs and 
their benefits are delayed. It is only in the special case described in the opening 
paragraph of this section that an increase in the rate of interest is unfavourable for 
biodiversity conservation. 
 
3. Macroeconomic Considerations 
In order to obtain a wider perspective on the relationship between the rate of interest 
and the extent to which biodiversity conservation occurs, it is necessary to take into 
account factors that determine the rate of interest. Macroeconomic models of the 
determination of the rate of interest are complex and varied. I shall use a simple and 
very crude model to make the point that there is not a close association between the 
rate of interest as such and the extent of biodiversity conservation. (However, note 
that my results would hold in the case of other models of interest rate determination.) 
In fact, I’ll use a simplified form of the loanable funds theory of interest (Wicksell, 
1936) to make my point even though Keynes made it clear that this theory has 
shortcomings. In other words, I maintain that a low rate of interest can be associated 
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with a high degree of biodiversity loss and so can a high rate of interest. This follows 
if the level of investment is man-made capital is regarded as the major factor leading 
to loss of biodiversity. In my view, this is a sound indicator of likely biodiversity loss 
(Tisdell, 2005, p. 250). That the accumulation of man-made capital is a major factor 
resulting in biodiversity loss has been pointed out for a long-time. For example, 
Harting (1880, p. 209) brings attention to the problem as does Tisdell (1982, p.378, 
1991) and Swanson (1994). 
 
For simplicity, assume that the real rate of interest depends only on the demand for 
loanable funds for investment and on the supply of these funds as a result of savings. 
Assume further that these demand and supply curves have normal slopes.  
 
First, it can be observed that in this case, an increase in the rate of interest can come 
about either because the demand for loanable funds rises (due to an increase in the 
marginal efficiency of capital), other things kept constant, or due to fall in the 
willingness to save, other things unchanged. These two situations are illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively. In the case shown in Figure 2, the demand for loanable 
funds rises from D1D1 to D2D2 and the supply curve of these funds remains unaltered 
as shown by S1S1. The equilibrium in the loanable funds market changes from E1 to 
E2 and the rate of interest rises from r1 to r2. The amount of funds invested goes up 
from X1 to X2. This result is unfavourable to biodiversity conservation because it 
results in more capital accumulation and conversion of natural resources into man-
made capital. On the other hand, in the case illustrated by Figure 3, a rise in the rate of 
interest is associated with a reduction in the level of investment and therefore is 
favourable to biodiversity conservation. In this case, the demand curve for loanable 
funds, D1D1 is stationary but the willingness to supply loanable funds declines, as 
shown by the supply line being initially S1S1 and subsequently S2S2. Market 
equilibrium alters from E1 to E2 and the rate of interest rises from r1 to r2. However, in 
this case, the level of investment falls from X1 to X0, and the result is favourable to 
biodiversity conservation.  
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Figure 2: A case in which a rising rate of interest is associated with a rise in the 
level of investment in man-made capital; a consequence likely to have an 
adverse impact on biodiversity conservation. 
 
r 
r2 
r1 
O X0 X1 X 
S1
S2
E2
E1
S1
S2
D1
D1
Quantity of loanable funds 
Rate of 
interest 
 
Figure 3:  A case in which a rise in the rate of interest is associated with a decline in 
the level of investment in man-made capital. This case is likely to be 
favourable to biodiversity conservation. 
 
Converse results also apply. If the demand curve in the case illustrated in Figure 2 
shifts downwards rather than up, the rate of interest falls but investment does likewise. 
On the other hand, if the supply curve of loanable funds moves downwards in the case 
illustrated by Figure 3, the interest rate falls but the level of investment rises. The fall 
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in the interest rate in the former case is favourable to biodiversity conservation but not 
in the latter one. 
 
Other examples could also be given. The above, however, is sufficient to show that at 
the macro-level, changes in the rate of interest can (depending on the circumstances) 
be associated with an increase or decrease in the level of investment in man-made 
capital. Dr. Bruce Littleboy has pointed out to me in a private communication that 
historically both rising and also falling interest rates have been associated with 
increased levels of investment. If investment in man-made capital is seen as the main 
threat to biodiversity conservation (which is a reasonable proposition) then it can be 
concluded that there is no close connection between the level of the real rate of 
interest and the degree of biodiversity conservation. This suggests that the focus of 
concern ought to be on variations in the level of man-made capital rather than on the 
rate of interest as a major influence on biodiversity conservation. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 The progress of the accumulation of man-made capital 
The discussion in the previous section only provided a limited insight into the 
determinants of capital accumulation. For instance, savings and investment levels tend 
to rise as aggregate income increases. Investment is usually the basis for further 
capital accumulation because of its impact on economic growth – rising incomes 
result in greater levels of saving and investment (Deane, 1935). Since the Industrial 
Revolution there has been a massive increase in capital accumulation with extremely 
adverse consequences for the conservation of biodiversity. 
 
Keynes thought it possible that capital could accumulate in modern times to such an 
extent that the marginal efficiency of capital would become zero (Keynes, 1936, 
Chapters 16 and 24). But of course, he only had in mind man-made capital. This 
would result in Keynes’ view in the rate of interest being zero or close to it. Yet it can 
be hypothesized that in order to reach this stationary state that there would have been 
a tremendous conversion of natural resources into man-made capital resulting in great 
biodiversity loss. Consequently, a zero rate of interest can be associated in this 
instance with major loss of biodiversity. 
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4.2 How can a zero social discount rate be made operative in a market system? 
A number of eminent economists favour a low or zero rate of social discount. To be 
operative in a market economy, this would seem to require that the rate of interest be 
regulated so that only a low value is allowed. This will, however, not result in the 
loanable funds market clearing if we use the model considered in the previous section. 
 
In Figure 4, if line DD represents the demand for loanable funds and SS is their 
supply, market equilibrium is established at E with r1 being the rate of interest and X1 
the equilibrium supply of loanable funds. Should the maximum allowable rate of 
interest be less than r1, a shortage of funds occurs at the regulated rate of interest. If 
for example, the maximum permitted rate of interest is zero, X2 of funds are 
demanded but only X0 are available. Excess demand equivalent to X2 − X0 occurs. 
r 
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Figure 4: It may be difficult to bring the market rate of interest into line with a low 
or zero rate of social discount. However, in the case illustrated above, 
restricting the rate of interest could be favourable to biodiversity 
conservation because it results in a low level of accumulation of man-
made capital. 
 
Despite the problem of the failure of the loanable funds market to clear when the rate 
of interest is restricted to artificially low levels, the restriction would favour 
biodiversity conservation. In the case shown in Figure 4, if the rate of interest is 
restricted to zero, it reduces the rate of capital accumulation from X1 to X0. 
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5. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that both from a microeconomic and a macroeconomic 
perspective, there is no general relationship between the level of the real rate of 
interest and the extent to which biodiversity is conserved. When the rate of interest 
changes, it is necessary to take into account additional factors to decide whether 
biodiversity conservation is advantaged or disadvantaged. While it might be 
appropriate to treat the welfare of future individuals on par with that of current 
generations (and therefore, apply a zero discount rate to measures of future human 
welfare), it is not clear how a zero (or low) discount rate would be put into practice in 
market or mixed economies. However, it is clear that some natural capital (including 
some degree of biodiversity) needs to be conserved to sustain future welfare. It is 
likely that the extent of biodiversity conservation would be greater if a regulated zero 
or low social discount rate is applied rather than a higher one and can be translated 
into practice. Nevertheless, it would most likely still result in continuing biodiversity 
loss because optimal growth objectives as specified by economists such as Pezzey and 
Toman (2002) are anthropogenic. This means that humankind is under no obligation 
to conserve species that do not add to human welfare. There are probably still many 
extant species of this type as well as others for which the opportunity cost of their 
retention exceeds whatever value they have for human beings. Thus, even a zero 
social discount rate could result in these species being eliminated if the common type 
of economic utility function is applied which maximizes the discounted flow of 
[human] welfare over time. It takes little account of man’s responsibility for the 
stewardship of nature. It is a further indication that even comparatively perfect 
economic systems are not very favourable to biodiversity conservation per se. 
 
It should also be noted that the analysis of biodiversity conservation is further 
complicated by uncertainty (see, for example, Bishop, 1978, 1979) and that the 
implications of this have not been allowed for in the above analysis. How best to 
respond to collective risks and uncertainties remains a major unresolved issue. While 
the precautionary principle (Tisdell, 1970; Arrow and Fischer, 1974) has been 
developed as one means of addressing the issue, the problem is far from resolved. 
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